


5239

The carrier MINSK, a highly capable unit
contributing to Soviet military power



SECRET/NOFORN

PROJECT SUN STREAK

WARNING NOTICE: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PROJECT NUMBER: 5239	SESSION NUMBER: 02
DATE OF SESSION: 11 JAN 89	DATE OF REPORT: 11 JAN 89
START: 0830	END: 0930
METHODOLOGY: ERV	VIEWER IDENTIFIER: 025

1. (S/NF/SK) MISSION: TO ACCESS AND DESCRIBE THE SOVIET UNION'S CARRIER CALLED THE MINSK.
2. (S/NF/SK) VIEWER TASKING: TO ACCESS AND DESCRIBE THE OBJECT AT COORDINATES 918212/871423.
3. (S/NF/SK) COMMENTS: NO INCLEMCENCIES NOTED. VIEWER WAS ABLE TO DESCRIBE THE WEAPONS DOWN UNDER THE CARRIER. VIEWER WAS ABLE TO DESCRIBE THE DECK. VIEWER KNEW THAT THE OBJECT WAS NAVIGATIONAL IN NATURE. REPORTING WAS GOOD. OVERALL, A SUCCESSFUL SESSION.
4. (S/NF/SK) EVALUATION: 3

HANDLE VIA SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
SECRET/NOFORN

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA (DT)
DECLASSIFY: OADR

Moscow has further maintained that the Soviet interceptors issued all the proper warnings prior to the destruction of the aircraft. Yet the transcript of the Soviet pilots' communications with their ground controllers clearly contradict this claim. KAL Flight 007 was intercepted and destroyed for having entered Soviet airspace. The Soviet explanation has not been accepted by either the United Nations or the International Civil Aviation Organization.

The Response

Soviet Military Power 1984 has reported the continuing expansion and improvement of the Soviet Union's military capabilities across the entire range of potential conflict:

- the modernization, increased capabilities and increased survivability of Soviet intercontinental and theater nuclear forces,
- the continuing development of new generations of ICBMs specifically designed to destroy US missile silos and the bases of US manned bomber deterrent forces,
- the continuing deployment of mobile SS-20 LRINF missiles,
- the swift advances in nuclear and conventional cruise missile capabilities,
- the introduction of new land, sea and air weapons systems, and the parallel improvements in combined arms capabilities,
- the continuing modernization and growth of a logistics system designed to sustain Soviet forces in the field for 60 to 90 days,
- the continuing high priority for military research, development and industry, and the exploitation of Western technology, and
- the increasing evidence of Soviet willingness to project and use military power, as reflected in the preceding case studies.

In light of this threat to the United States and its Allies, the challenge is clear. We must maintain military capabilities sufficient to convince the Soviets that the costs of aggression would be far greater than any possible benefit. These capabilities are the cornerstone of our defense policy. US policy toward the Soviet Union, however, is not merely based on deterrence of Soviet aggression. As the

United States has stressed, we are firmly committed, as well, to the pursuit of a comprehensive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at minimizing the risk of war and solving some of the real problems in our relationship. Reducing arms and ensuring a more stable military balance stand at the top of our agenda.

The United States' strategic and conventional deterrent has been effective in keeping the peace for more than a generation. In the 38 years since World War II—years marked by periods of major tension and crisis—there has been no nuclear conflict. There has been no military conflict between East-West in Europe, nor any direct combat between the forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations in any corner of the globe.

Over the past two decades, the Soviet Union has expanded and modernized its military forces despite US restraint in weapons programs and efforts to achieve meaningful negotiated arms reductions. It is because we recognize the reality of the Soviet threat that we are taking the necessary steps to maintain a truly credible deterrent capability and, thus, to preserve peace and freedom, while continuing to work for significant, equitable and verifiable arms reductions.

We harbor no illusions about the consequences of any nuclear war between ourselves and the Soviet Union. We believe that neither side could win such a war, but this belief alone is not sufficient to assure prevention of a nuclear war or coercion. We seek to maintain a stable strategic deterrent through a range of strategic retaliatory forces—a Triad of land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and manned strategic bombers. This combination of retaliatory options is designed to complicate Soviet planning for any execution of a successful attack against all three force components, while at the same time defending against Soviet technological breakthroughs against any single leg of the Triad. In addition to the multiplicity and flexibility provided in the Triad, strategic nuclear deterrence requires an effective command, control and communications system. Our goal, our strategy and our defense programs are designed to ensure that the Soviet leadership understands as well that there can be no winner in a nuclear war and that the West has the confidence to resist Soviet intimidation.

Soviet advances put at risk the elements of

our retaliatory forces and demand that we improve these elements. We have made the hard decisions required to maintain our nuclear deterrent, and we have begun to redress deficiencies in strategic systems. Our programs introducing the PEACEKEEPER (MX) ICBM, B-1B strategic bomber, TRIDENT II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile and upgraded command, control and communications systems to our forces are examples.

In addition to our strategic nuclear forces, the United States maintains nuclear forces in Europe to deter Soviet attacks against our NATO Allies. These forces are linked with our conventional and strategic nuclear forces under a single, coherent policy of deterrence.

Soviet deployment of SS-20 LRINF missiles in recent years, however, has called into question the NATO deterrent posture. The 1979 NATO dual-track decision—deployment of US GLCM and PERSHING II missiles to Europe, while pursuing an equitable, verifiable arms reduction agreement—reaffirms the credibility of NATO's deterrent. In the face of the USSR's unwillingness thus far to negotiate such an agreement, we have initiated deployment of the GLCMs and PERSHING IIs. Nevertheless, we still hope for, and actively seek, resumption of negotiations to reduce or eliminate all US and Soviet LRINF missiles.

Looking to the continuing challenge, we are examining the possibility of a defense against ballistic missiles. The United States has embarked on the analysis required to define a technically feasible research program in this area and to assess implications of defensive technologies for the prevention of nuclear war, the deterrence of aggression and the prospects for arms reductions.

The composition and role of the United States' conventional forces and those of our Allies are defensive in nature to support a defensive policy. We seek no territorial gain and employ our forces only to defend against threats to our interests and security. This policy allows a potential aggressor the advantage of being able to select the time, place and method of any planned attack to maximize his strength and exploit our weaknesses. To compensate for this, the United States must have effective and reliable command, control, communications and intelligence systems and flexible and mobile conventional land, sea and air warfare forces that can respond rapid-

ly and fight effectively in any contingency.

We have undertaken programs to enhance the capabilities of our central command authorities and military force commanders to obtain more extensive and timely information and to communicate effectively with their forces. At the same time, we are improving the readiness of our forces to respond quickly to attack, and we are upgrading Reserve component forces, enabling them to mobilize rapidly and deploy to battle areas early enough to influence a conflict. We are improving force mobility through procurement of airlift and sea-lift forces, and we are prepositioning equipment and supplies in key theaters to enable rapid response in areas of conflict.

To redress deficiencies in our ability to sustain any conflict, we are investing in munitions, spares and other materiel. We are continuing with programs to modernize our forces with upgraded weaponry to give them a qualitative edge so essential should combat be required against superior numbers. We are expanding the size of selected types of forces, where past neglect has resulted in shortfalls. We are also improving, domestically and internationally, our export control system to halt Soviet exploitation of militarily-significant Western equipment and technology.

The defense programs we and our Allies are pursuing are redressing critical deficiencies in the military balance. These programs are designed to maintain the deterrent element of our defense policy. This task is not an easy one, nor can it be realized over a short period of time. If our deterrent is to remain effective, we and our Allies must maintain a commitment to the completion of these programs and to taking whatever additional steps are necessary to deny the Soviets political advantage through the use or the potential use of their Armed Forces. Only through demonstrated commitment on our part to denying the Soviets such advantage may we hope to bring them to the negotiating table for serious arms reductions. Consistency in our resolve to maintain the security of all free nations is essential if we are to realize the much more desirable goal—greatly reduced levels of armaments of all types in a world at peace.

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